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Executive Summary 
 
ublic health risk communication is a central feature of New York City’s pandemic 
flu preparedness plan. Particularly in the early stages of a pandemic, before 
effective therapeutic measures are available, non-pharmaceutical interventions 
such as social distancing, personal protective hygiene, and voluntary isolation are critical 
strategies for suppressing the spread of a novel viral strain. New York City health and 
emergency management officials have decided to use the city’s risk communication 
structure – the Office of Emergency Management’s Ready New York outreach and 
dissemination capacities – as one of the primary means to communicate pandemic flu 
health messages. In October 2008, NCDP contracted with Public Health Solutions and 
the Office of Emergency Management (OEM) to evaluate the reach and effectiveness of 
its planned Ready NY Pandemic Flu community outreach campaign. Among the 
evaluation research questions considered were:  
 
 What is the potential value, efficacy, and community perception of the Ready NY 
brochure and community presentation? 
 How do different NYC communities approach preparedness and response to a 
pandemic flu? 
 How do communities vary in their approach to such critical communication issues 
such as message content and style, messengers and media, and message 
dissemination timing? 
 
In order to evaluate the outreach campaign, the OEM stock presentation was piloted in 
six distinct NYC neighborhoods and feedback was gathered through subsequent focus 
group discussions. Communities were selected such that geographically, ethnically, and 
linguistically diverse citizen groups within the city were represented, and participants 
were recruited primarily through random, street-based recruiting. Selected 
neighborhoods span four of the five boroughs and represent unique cultural and ethnic 
identities: Greek/European in Astoria; African American in Bedford-Stuyvesant; Chinese 
in Chinatown; Indian/Bengali in Jackson Heights; Caribbean/Jamaican in Wakefield; and 
Dominican/Latin American in Washington Heights. A case-control design was 
incorporated into the evaluation to account for behavior change, information retention, 
and situational awareness that may have arisen as a result of the focus group discussion 
rather than from the intervention itself. All participants attended the presentation, 
received a brochure and completed a baseline questionnaire, but roughly half the 
participants – the cases – partook in the focus group discussion. All respondents were 
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Findings 
Focus group discussion topics explored strengths and weaknesses of the Ready New 
York Pandemic Flu materials and how culturally diverse customs affect citizens' 
reception of the city's messaging. Among the central findings are the following: 
 
 Communities are concerned that the uneducated and ignorant will act as vectors 
and put others at risk of infection.  There was similar concern regarding children, 
the elderly, and the isolated. 
 Public transportation lines are seen as sources of infection, but also opportune 
places to promote good health practices. 
 Although the presentation and brochure were highly regarded, participants were 
left with a number of unanswered questions which may be incorporated into 
future outreach strategies. 
 Preferred message timing differs by community – some want a just-in-time type 
message and others feel information should be distributed as early as possible. 
 Doctors, schools, and religious leaders were commonly cited as trusted sources 
of information in all communities. The mayor and other government officials were 
highly regarded in some places, while others were much less trusting.  
 
Data from the follow-up interviews allowed assessment of participants’ behavior change, 
information retention, and situational awareness in the 4-6 weeks following the 
intervention.  Interview data was analyzed to determine any significant differences 
between both cases and controls and among neighborhoods. Due to small sample sizes 
across all groups, few differences between cases and controls were found to be 
statistically significant. Cases, however, were more likely than controls to remember 
details about the differences between pandemic and seasonal flu, personal protective 
measures, and what the city will do in the event of a pandemic. They were also more 
likely to use the suggested sources of additional information.   
 
Analysis of neighborhood-level differences in follow-up data shows that no two 
communities are alike. Respondents from Bedford-Stuyvesant, Wakefield, and Astoria 
were able to recall a broader spectrum of topics than were the other neighborhoods, and 
were furthermore more likely to want a community-specific format of the presentation.  
Wakefield respondents found the brochure to be less visually appealing than other 
groups, and were the least likely to have read or shared it or to have used any of the 
recommended sources of information. Compliance with recommendations also differed 
by community. Respondents from Astoria and Chinatown were much less likely than 
others to have stocked food and over-the-counter medication by follow-up. People from 
Bedford-Stuyvesant were least likely to have followed social distancing precautions. 
 
Among all respondents overall home preparedness significantly increased from baseline 
to follow-up (63% to 93%).  Personal preparedness strategies with the lowest rates of 
compliance include stocking over-the-counter medications (52%), stocking prescription 
medication (35%), stopping sharing food and drinks (54%), and staying home if sick 
(61%). Hygiene-related personal protective measures were the most commonly recalled 
message component. While many respondents had used 311, a total of 62% of people 
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Recommendations 
Three major themes emerged from focus group and follow-up data: the saliency of risk, 
community response and perception, and issues of communication. On the topic of 
saliency and risk, the city should consider the following strategies to make their health 
communication and outreach even more effective: 
 
 Communities were quite responsive to the dramatic consequences of the 1918 
flu and to the similarities to other “known” communicable diseases which have no 
vaccine and no cure, such as HIV/AIDS, SARS or avian flu.  Consider 
exemplifying these issues to raise the public’s perception of risk. 
 In order to combat public uncertainty about saliency of the threat and the value of 
recommended actions, develop easily accessible answers to the most frequently 
asked questions. 
 
The studied communities varied widely in their attitudes, perceptions, and anticipated 
behaviors. These findings suggest something about the ways that different communities 
depend upon and trust in government and community-based institutions, and the roles 
that each might play in communicating critical emergency messages. For example, in 
communities that are less trusting of government but have high dependence on 
community institutions, the city may benefit from collaborative efforts with mediating 
community institutions. In considering how the city could engage communities more 
directly, several broad recommendations are offered:  
 
 Continue to expand existing partnerships through the Ready New York 
infrastructure through CERTs and community boards. 
 Expand partnerships to include religious leaders and institutions, which may use 
religious ethics to disseminate and craft messages around shared responsibility, 
adopt strategies that take into account the need to modify current religious 
practices, and otherwise convey key messages about social distancing. 
 Develop community-based sites where information and medical care may be 
accessed in the event of a pandemic, so hospital emergency departments would 
not be regarded as the only available service and information site. 
 
Under the rubric of communication, which includes issues regarding messengers, 
messages, media, and timing, some additional recommendations are offered: (1) to 
consider developing a “hard-sell” campaign similar to the state’s smoking cessation 
campaign ; (2) to avoid the terms “isolation” and “quarantine,” which have negative 
connotations to many people, and are generally misunderstood; (3) to address the 
subway as both a potential infection site and as a critical messaging platform, since it 
was of great concern to many of the community respondents; (4) to consider private 
medical doctors as a key information dissemination source and service site; (5) to 
consider mailing brochures; and (6) to encourage the utilization of telephone and 
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Conclusion 
In summary, this evaluation of the Ready New York pandemic flu outreach campaign 
suggests that it is a successful platform from which to engage different New York City 
communities, and that the nature of the engagement varies from community to 
community. Each community welcomed the opportunity to discuss specific concerns, 
and all acknowledged how difficult it will be to gain the attention of their community, 
particularly in the absence of a clear and present threat. Perhaps most important for city 
planners to take into account is that community attention and receptivity rises in tandem 
with (a) empirical evidence of the salience of the threat, and (b) uncertainty about the 
most advantageous health behaviors and decisions. Clear, authoritative messaging can 
validate the salience of the threat, and also provide focused guidelines and 
recommendations to the city’s many communities. The mechanisms for delivering health 
messages should be many and varied, and the city should consider multiple ways with 
which to engage its residents. Partnering with community-focused institutions, ethnic 
press, and faith-based institutions as sponsors and “co-leaders” of these message 
dissemination strategies can enhance the city’s reach, and capitalize on the strengths of 
the many different neighborhoods, communities, and affiliations of those who live and 
work in New York City. 
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Introduction 
 
wo years ago, Columbia University’s National Center for Disaster Preparedness 
reported to the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene on 
research it had conducted on New York City community preparedness for a flu 
pandemic, with a particular focus on how racially and ethnically-homogeneous 
neighborhoods might vary in their response to such an event
1
.  Among the report’s 
findings were that communities varied in their trust in and dependency upon local 
government, the variable strength of their social networks that might be activated during 
a disaster, and the perceived “trusted” sources of health and risk information.  These 
results were very much in keeping with the academic literature, including several major 
review articles that catalogued the ways that ethnic and minority communities have been 
historically more vulnerable to disasters, less trusting of public authority, and whose 
social isolation often places them in harm’s way
2
.   
 
Much like a giant version of the children’s game “Telephone,” in which a message 
delivered serially from one child to the next is transformed in to something entirely 
different from the original message, emergency communication is socially re-constructed 
and re-interpreted by different communities.  A prominent model in the risk 
communication and disaster warning literature is that of Turner and Killian’s emergent 
norm theory of collective behavior.  It stipulates that when groups are faced with a need 
to act in the face of relative uncertainty they collectively develop a new set of norms by 
which to interpret information and make decisions.  According to this theory, groups 
collectively decide if they are personally in danger, whether they can reduce their 
vulnerability to the danger, and how and when they should act
3
.  Similarly, Witte’s 
Extended Parallel Process Model argues that people take protective action based on the 
saliency of a threat (it’s severity and their susceptibility) and the perceived value of 
recommended actions (a person’s self-efficacy to accomplish the action, and a valuation 
of the action itself to avert or address the threat)
4
.  Explicit in both these models is 
that different communities will hear and respond to messages differently. 
 
Public health risk communication is a central feature of New York City’s pandemic flu 
preparedness plan.  Particularly in the early stages of a pandemic, before effective 
therapeutic measures are available, non-pharmaceutical interventions such as social 
distancing, personal protective hygiene, and voluntary isolation are critical strategies for 
suppressing the spread of a novel viral strain.  New York City health and emergency 
management officials have decided to use the city’s risk communication structure – the 
Office of Emergency Management’s Ready New York outreach and dissemination 
capacities – as one of the primary means to communicate pandemic flu health 
messages.   
                                                 
1
  EJ Fuller, DM Abramson, J Sury (2007). “Unanticipated Consequences of Pandemic Flu in New York City: 
A Neighborhood Focus Group Study.”  Columbia U: NCDP Research Brief, 2007_10. 
2
  See DP Andrulis, NJ Siddiqui, and JL Gantner (2007). “Preparing racially and ethnically diverse 
communities for public health emergencies.”  Health Affairs, 26(5):1269-1279, and A Fothergill, EGM 
Maestas, and JD Darlington (1999). “Race, ethnicity and disasters in the United States: A review of the 
literature.”  Disasters, 23(2):156-173. 
3
  RH Turner and LM Killian (1987). Collective Behavior (3rd Edition). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
4
  K Witte (1998).  Fear as motivator, fear as inhibitor: Using the extended parallel process models to explain 
fear appeal successes and failures.  In PA Anderson and LK Guerrero (eds), The handbook of 
communication and emotion: Research, theory, applications, and contexts. NY: Academic Press, pp 423-
450. 
T 
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In October 2008, NCDP contracted with Public Health Solutions and the Office of 
Emergency Management to evaluate the reach and effectiveness of its planned Ready 
NY Pandemic Flu community campaign.  Among the evaluation research questions 
considered were: 
 
 What is the potential value, efficacy, and community perception of the Ready NY 
brochure and community presentation? 
 What community-level issues arise related to the saliency of the threat and the 
perceived risk of pandemic flu? 
 How do different NYC communities approach preparedness and response to a 
pandemic flu? 
 How do communities vary in their approach to such critical communication issues 
such as message content and style, messengers and media, and message 
dissemination timing? 
 What questions remain unanswered after community presentations? 
 
The NCDP research team decided to use a similar qualitative research method to that 
employed in the earlier community-based work, and to use the same six communities as 
living laboratories: Washington Heights (Manhattan – Dominican population), Chinatown 
(Manhattan – Chinese population), Astoria (Queens – Greek population), Jackson 
Heights (Queens – Indian, Pakistani, and Bengali populations), Wakefield (Bronx – 
Caribbean populations), and Bedford Stuyvesant (Brooklyn – African American and 
Caribbean populations).  In addition, a research team from Maimonides Medical Center 
headed by Dr. Hillary Cohen agreed to replicate our research protocol among two 
Brooklyn-based populations in their catchment area, an Orthodox Jewish population and 
a Pakistani 
population.   
 
Data collection for the 
research field effort 
was predicated on the 
city’s completion of 





training of presenters.  
As it happened, the 
final draft of the 
Ready NY Pandemic 
Flu presentation and 
brochure – and the 
training of volunteer 
presenters from the 
city’s Medical 
Reserve Corps – 
coincided with the outbreak 
of the H1N1 novel virus in 
late April 2009.  Initial news 
Figure 1: Influenza-like Illness Emergency Department 
visits in NYC, National survey data on concern about 
swine flu illness, and timing of focus groups. 
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reports of the novel virus were widely circulated on April 24
th
, and there was sustained 
public and media interest in the subject for several weeks.  As Figure 1 illustrates, the 
incidence of this first wave of the pandemic crested in early June, as evidenced by 
emergency department visits, and predated the research team’s data collection by 
several weeks.  The actuality of the pandemic event certainly colored the attitudes, 
interest, and perceptions of community respondents, and the apparent mildness of the 
virus influenced community-wide perceptions of the actual threat as well.  National 
opinion tracking, also illustrated in Figure 1, suggests that the general public’s perceived 
personal risk crested before the actual incidence did.  Although NYC trended opinion 
data were not available to the NCDP research team, anecdotal reports and the 
community’s responses in the focus groups echoed some of that declining risk 









The OEM’s information dissemination strategy consists of conducting informational 
presentations and distributing brochures throughout New York City.  In order to evaluate 
the efficacy of this strategy, we piloted the OEM stock presentation in NYC 
neighborhoods and held a focus group discussion immediately thereafter.  Focus group 
discussions are not typically part of the OEM strategy, but are a necessary component of 
our evaluation process.  Consequently, it was necessary to take into account any impact 
participation in the focus group discussion may have had on participants’ behavior 
change, information retention, and situational awareness.  Since the topics discussed in 
the focus group inevitably subjected participants to the beliefs and knowledge of other 
group members, it was hypothesized that the focus group would act as a supplement to 
the intended intervention and influence participant responses at follow-up.   
 
To address this issue, we incorporated a “nested case-control” design.  This method 
provides a reference group – “controls” – who received only the intended intervention 
strategy, and a comparison group – “cases” – who additionally participated in a focus 
group discussion.  The separation of cases and controls enabled direct assessment of 
differences in comprehension, retention and behavior change at follow-up as a function 
of the educational materials alone versus the added influence of the focus group 
discussion.  Aside from participation in the focus group, case and control groups 
participated in exactly the same activities.   
 
 
Figure 2. Study Design for Ready New York Evaluation Project 
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Site Identification 
Community-based focus groups were conducted in six select communities within New 
York City.  Communities were selected such that geographically, ethnically, and 
linguistically diverse citizen groups within the city were represented.  The neighborhoods 
span four of the five boroughs of New York and represent six unique cultural and ethnic 
identities: Greek/European in Astoria; African American in Bedford-Stuyvesant; Chinese 
in Chinatown; Indian/Bengali in Jackson Heights; Caribbean/Jamaican in Wakefield; and 
Dominican/Latin American in Washington Heights.  Meeting venues were selected 
based on target recruitment area, access by foot and public transportation, and cultural 
appropriateness.  Venue types included restaurants, community centers, and religious 
gathering sites.   
 
Figure 3. Focus Group Venues by Neighborhood 
*Maimonides groups were conducted through a sister study to be described below. 
 
Recruitment 
Study participants were recruited directly from the selected neighborhoods on the days 
of and directly before the gathering.  Recruitment of study participants was primarily 
street-based, with trained recruiters handing out flyers and explaining the study to 
passersby.  Recruiters aimed to recruit between 30 and 40 individuals for each 
neighborhood in anticipation of low turnout rates.  To reach our recruitment quota, a 
Citywide Messaging and Community Receptivity – Ready New York Evaluation Project  12 
targeted sampling strategy was utilized to ensure appropriate numbers of each 
respective ethnic group, equal numbers of men and women, young and old, aged 18 
years and older.  To achieve the most diverse sample, efforts were made to recruit only 
one member from each household.  All recruiting was conducted in English, with the 
exception of the Chinatown and Washington Heights sites, in which recruitment was 
conducted in Cantonese and Spanish, respectively.   
 
Initial recruits were asked to provide their name and telephone number, and were given 
a recruitment flyer with a unique identification code.  The code indicated recruitment site, 
age group, and sex of participant, and acted as a form of identification at the event.  
Participants were informed that their flyers did not ensure a spot in the study, nor did 
they represent a final commitment to attend; they were also told that study participation 
was limited to the first 20 arrivals.  Due to the fairly complex study design, specifics of 
the study were printed on the back of the flyer and recruiters explained the design to all 
new recruits. 
 
The day of the study, the field team contacted all previously recruited individuals by 
telephone in order to confirm their intention to participate in the study that evening.  For 
neighborhoods with low interest or in which we anticipated low turnout rates, recruiters 
were sent out the day of the meeting to recruit additional participants as needed.  Due to 
low turnout rates in the first two communities (Astoria and Jackson Heights), the 
recruitment technique was altered in subsequent communities to supplement street 
recruitment with use of an agency or community liaison.  Liaisons were trained on the 
recruitment strategy and were supplied with official recruitment flyers.    
 
The Intervention 
Upon arrival to the study, all participants were required to present their flyer so that their 
unique identification number could be matched with the information on our recruiting 
sheet.  Individuals who heard about the study by word of mouth and did not receive a 
flyer from a recruiter were not eligible for participation.  Individuals were then semi-
randomly divided into case and control groups and received color-coded forms which 
indicated for tracking purposes to which group they had been assigned.  A maximum of 
24 people were admitted to each neighborhood gathering, with no more than 12 
participants assigned to participate in the focus group in any one neighborhood.  In 
locations where more than 24 people showed up to the meeting, excess individuals were 
assigned to the “control” group and participated in the presentation and questionnaire, 
but were then dismissed.  If fewer than 12 individuals showed up, all participants were 
assigned to the “case” group, as the focus group was the most critical component of this 
study.   
 
Both “case” and “control” participants were given a long consent form, OEM brochure, 
and baseline questionnaire.  After a short introduction, the facilitator summarized the 
informed consent form which was signed and collected.  The baseline questionnaire was 
then read aloud to mitigate complications due to literacy, language, or comprehension 
barriers.  The Ready New York Pandemic Flu presentation was then given by a trained 
Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) volunteer to all participants.  With the exception of the 
Spanish- and Chinese-speaking groups, which were entirely conducted in the native 
language, all presentations were given by the MRC volunteer in order to facilitate 
continuity of content among groups, and to minimize the addition or omission of 
information across presentations.  The volunteers who presented the OEM intervention 
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Key Areas of Discussion 
 
 Saliency of Message 
 Belief in Control over Transmission and 
Recommended Behavioral Changes 
 Preparation Recommendations 
 Trust in Government 
 What Your Community Needs to Know 
 Effectiveness of the Presentation and Brochure 
in the foreign language groups were trained by the MRC volunteer to preserve 
consistency of message throughout the presentation locations.  Duration of the 
presentation was limited to 20 minutes, and the brochure was referred to multiple times 
throughout the demonstration as a visual aid and supplementary source of information.  
Participants were asked to refrain from asking questions in order to keep presentation 
content consistent across neighborhood groups.   
 
Following the presentation, members of the “control” group checked out, and “cases” 
gathered for the focus group discussion. Focus groups were held directly following the 
viewing of the Ready New York presentation, and centered on evaluation of both 
presentation and brochure, and community attitudes and awareness.  Each focus group 
was composed of at least 6 people, and lasted about one hour on average.  Check-out 
procedures included verification completed questionnaire and informed consent sheets, 
confirmation of contact information, and disbursal of participant incentives.  Members of 
the control group were compensated a total of $30 cash for their participation and 
members of the case group were compensated a total of $50 cash to account for the 
additional time spent participating in the focus group.  All participants were given a 
written reminder of our intent to contact them for a follow-up interview 6 to 8 weeks in the 
future.   
 
Focus Group Discussion Topics 
Using the focus group method as a primary source of data, we were able to identify 
strengths and weaknesses of the Ready New York Pandemic Flu materials, and 
furthermore explore how culturally diverse customs and beliefs directly affect citizens' 
understanding and retention of the city's guidelines in the event of pandemic flu.  The 
focus group discussions were facilitated by an experienced moderator, who helped to 
create a non-evaluative environment in which participants were free to express their 
thoughts and feelings comfortably and with minimal concern for the differing opinions of 
others in the group.  Use of 
name placards in front of each 
respondent helped create 
feeling of intimacy and enabled 
the moderator to encourage less 
vocal group members to 
contribute.  While the guide 
outlined specific topic areas of 
interest, the moderator was free 
to probe deeper into topics as 
they arose or to deviate from the 
guide if an unanticipated topic of interest came up in discussion.   
 
At least one note taker was present at each focus group.  The note taker’s role was to 
observe the process, take note of any non-verbal cues, alert the moderator of timing, 
and keep track of any topics that may not have been discussed in the desired amount of 
detail.  All focus group discussions were conducted in English, with the exception of 
those in Washington Heights and Chinatown, which were moderated in Spanish and 
Cantonese, respectively.  Digitally recorded audio files which were later transcribed and 
analyzed by the research team were made of each focus group discussion.  Participants 
were made aware of this intent both verbally and through the written consent form.   
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Follow Up Survey Topics 
Follow-up interviews of both cases and controls were administered a total of 4 to 6 
weeks following the initial gathering.  Interviews were completed over the telephone, and 
conducted by trained members of the field staff.  
Interviewers used a web-based Computer-Aided 
Phone Interview (CAPI) system to reduce 
systematic errors in data collection.  The survey 
was designed such that comparison could be 
made between it and the baseline questionnaire 
and focus group responses.  Survey questions 
further investigated the topics introduced in the 
baseline questionnaire and centered on information retention, message dissemination, 
behavior change and level of preparedness, and situational awareness as a result of the 
intervention.  Survey topics were divided into four sections, and each section consisted 
of both multiple choice and open-ended questions. The interviewer was encouraged to 
probe deeper into topics for which the respondent had limited response.   
 
Maimonides Companion Study 
Through a companion study conducted through Maimonides Hospital’s Emergency 
Department, baseline and follow-up data for two additional communities – Orthodox 
Jewish and Pakistani – in the Boro Park region of Brooklyn were gathered.  The parallel 
research design utilized identical baseline and follow up surveys, OEM presentation, and 
focus group discussion guide.  While many elements of the study design remained 
constant between the two studies, there were two main differences: 1) the Maimonides 
study consulted with “ethnic leaders” to identify issues that could be incorporated into a 
community-specific presentation; 2) both the “official” OEM presentation and the ethnic 
leader-derived community-specific presentation were piloted in each of the two 
communities to determine whether a community-specific presentation impacts 
comprehension, recall, or behavior modification.   
 
Due to differences between the Maimonides and NCDP study aims, respondents 
recruited from the Maimonides study are considered “cases” for the purposes of this 
study, as they all participated in a focus group discussion.  Although the underlying 
hypotheses of each of the two studies differed, data collection methods between the two 
were nearly identical, which enabled baseline and follow-up data to be shared between 
cohorts. 
Follow-up Survey Topics 
 
 Evaluation of Presentation 
 Evaluation of Brochure 
 Personal Preparedness 
 Personal Reactions 




Table 1 depicts select socio-demographic characteristics of the cohort by neighborhood 
(see Table A1 in Appendix for complete composite).  Overall, a total of 96 respondents 
were recruited from the six neighborhoods in the NCDP catchment area, and an 
additional 78 respondents were recruited through the Maimonides sister study, for a total 
of 174 participants from eight different neighborhoods.  Of the 96 participants recruited 
through NCDP, there were 58 cases and 38 controls, whereas all 78 participants 
recruited through Maimonides were assigned to the control group.  Group size varied by 
neighborhood, with the smallest group in Jackson Heights and the largest in Chinatown.  
The average group size was 12 participants.  
 
 
Table 1: Select Sociodemographic Characteristics by Neighborhood 
  Astoria Bed-Stuy Chinatown Jackson Hts Wakefield Wash Hts 
Borough  Queens Brooklyn Manhattan Queens Bronx Manhattan 







Total (n) 96 13 15 31 6 16 15 
Cases 58 13 9 11 6 10 9 
Controls 38 0 6 20 0 6 6 
Foreign-born 
(%) 
 53.9 46.7 96.8 83.3 62.5 100.0 
Language  English English Cantonese English English Spanish 
 
 
The overall cohort was approximately half male and half female, with slight variation in 
each community.  The mean age of the cohort was about 45 years old, with the 
youngest group being the Maimonides Pakistanis (mean age 35 years old) and the 
oldest being the Chinese in Chinatown (mean age 56 years old).  A total of 40% of 
participants were employed, and about one-third of all respondents had children in the 
household.  There was an overall percentage of about 65% who were foreign born, with 
the largest populations in Washington Heights and Chinatown (100% and 97%, 
respectively) and the smallest in the Maimonides Pakistani and Jewish communities 
(25% and 28%, respectively). Poverty rates exceeded 30% in five out of the eight 
communities, with the average poverty rate of the cohort at 21% - a rate nearly twice the 
national average of 12% (CITE).   
 
Baseline Data 
Data derived from the baseline questionnaire reflect differences pre-focus group 
preparedness attitudes and behaviors among the eight neighborhoods (Appendix Table 
A2).  As seen in Table 2, self-proclaimed levels of preparedness were low in all groups, 
with less than one-third of respondents claiming to be prepared for a major disaster.  A 
total of 31% of all respondents indicated they had no intent to prepare at all.  The 
Chinatown and Maimonides Pakistani participants were most prepared, with 58% and 
39% of respondents, respectively, “prepared or preparing” for a major disaster; the 
Jackson Heights and Wakefield groups were least prepared, with preparedness levels 
below 10%.  One-third of all respondents had experienced some sort of major disaster in 
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the past, although prior experience did not necessarily reflect levels of preparedness.  
Among the two most prepared groups – Chinese and Pakistani – the Chinese had the 
highest percentage of respondents that had previously experienced a disaster (65%), 
while the Pakistani group had the lowest (18%).   
 
Table 2: Levels of Preparedness by Neighborhood 













Total (n) 174 13 15 31 6 16 15 50 28 
Preparedness Behavioral Stage (%) 
Not yet 
prepared  
37 39 53 26 33 69 47 30 32 
Prepared 30 23 33 58 0 6 20 22 39 
No intent to 
prepare 
31 39 7 13 50 25 33 48 29 
% Disaster Experience 
 33 31 40 65 17 31 33 24 18 
 
 
The length of time a household could last on current food supplies and the percentage of 
people that received the flu shot in the previous year were also not necessarily indicative 
of a community’s self-proclaimed level of preparation for a disaster.  Chinatown, in which 
60% of respondents claimed to be prepared for disasters, had the second-highest 
number of people who could not last more than 4 days without going to the grocery 
store.  Conversely, Wakefield, which had one of the lowest levels of preparedness, had 
one of the highest proportions of people getting the flu shot and being able to last more 
than 5 days on their current grocery supply.  Overall, about 37% of respondents received 
the flu shot during the previous year, while about 62% could last five days or longer on 
the food they have in their house.  Washington Heights falls far below the average when 
it comes to the amount of food they have in their homes, with 40% of respondents 
saying they could only last 1 day.  Astoria falls far below the average in respect to 






Table 3: Anticipated Role in a Disaster by Neighborhood 














Total (n) 174 13 15 31 6 16 15 50 28 
Anticipated Disaster Role (%) 
Leader 18 23 60 7 17 13 47 12 4 
“Lone wolf” 55 69 33 40 67 63 13 60 86 
Turn to others 25 8 7 52 0 25 33 20 10 
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Attitudes regarding leadership in a disaster situation also varied significantly by 
neighborhood (Table 3).  While a total of 18% said others would look to them for 
leadership (“Leader”), 55% said they would work alone to protect themselves and their 
family (“Lone wolf”), and 25% would either turn to someone else for leadership or wait 
for help to arrive (“Turn to others”), this breakdown is not consistent across all groups.  
The Bedford-Stuyvesant and Washington Heights groups were much more likely than 
the other groups to be leaders (60% and 47%), with other people turning to them for 
help.  Chinatown was by far the most likely to look to someone else for leadership 
(39%), while the majority of the remaining five groups would work alone to protect 
themselves and their families.  Whereas Chinatown had high faith in the government’s 
ability to respond in an epidemic, Bed-Stuy took the opposite stance.  Overall, 
confidence in the government’s ability to respond during an epidemic ranged from the 
very skeptical Astoria and Bed-Stuy groups (39% and 40%) to the very confident 
Maimonides Pakistani, Jackson Heights, and Chinatown groups (89%, 83%, and 81%).  
On average, about two-thirds of respondents felt the government would come through 
for them in a pandemic situation.   
 
News information sources also differed among communities.  Television was as the 
leading source of information (44%), although Astoria utilized radio and internet just as 
frequently, and the Maimonides Jewish population actually preferred all other options 
over television.  Internet ranked as the second most common source of information, but 
its use was practically non-existent in Bedford-Stuyvesant, Chinatown, and Wakefield 
and very limited in Washington Heights and Jackson Heights.  Radio and newspaper 
use similarly differed greatly from one community to another.    
 
Focus Groups 
Appendix Table A3 (general findings matrix) shows focus group findings by 
neighborhood.  Findings are separated into three major themes: Risk/Threat/Virus, 
Community Preparedness and Response, and Messages, Messengers and 
Communication Platforms.  The Risk/Threat/Virus theme incorporates respondents’ 
perception of risk, concerns and vulnerabilities, dominant worldview, and feelings of 
control over transmission.  Community Preparedness and Response reflects the current 
neighborhood cohesion, any barriers to compliance with recommendations, existing 
community infrastructure, and ideas about the role of the government versus the 
individual.  The Messages, Messengers and Communication Platforms theme delineates 
communities’ preferred methods of risk communication, saliency of health 
communication messages, and trusted sources of information.  
 
Theme 1: Risk/Threat/Virus 
 Many communities felt the uneducated and ignorant would act as vectors and put 
others at risk of infection.  Astoria, Washington Heights and Wakefield felt more 
at risk due to the variety of social classes in their neighborhoods, and the inability 
of the lower class to receive medical attention and stay home if sick.   
 The increased risk of disease transmission on public transportation lines was a 
common concern in nearly all communities. Many respondents said they would 
be unable to avoid crowds or public gatherings because of their reliance on 
buses or the subway to get around the city.    
 Media hyperbole and prolonged coverage of the issue decreases perception of 
risk.  Astoria, Jackson Heights, and Wakefield indicated their perception of risk 
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has waned over time, since the media seems to have blown the issue of swine 
flu out of proportion.   
 Communities expressed concern for traditionally vulnerable populations such as 
the elderly, children, and the isolated.  Chinatown, Jackson Heights, Astoria, and 
Maimonides Pakistani groups voiced increased concern for the older generation 
due to language barrier and a lower level of connectedness to sources of 
information.   
 
Theme 2: Community Preparedness and Response 
 Communities varied in their overall level of preparedness and anticipated 
response to a pandemic.  Some communities, such as Astoria and Maimonides 
Jewish, found it difficult to stockpile extra food because of their habitual reliance 
on fresh produce; others, such as Jackson Heights and Wakefield, were much 
more amenable to keeping large supplies of food in the home.  A general 
concern among all communities was the lack of space for many days’ worth of 
food and water.  
 Religious institutions and community organizations are seen as extremely 
reliable sources of both material and emotional support in a crisis.  
 Attitudes and expectations of the government’s role in a pandemic vary.  
Communities such as Astoria and Wakefield feel it is ultimately the government’s 
responsibility to provide for its citizens in an emergency, while Chinatown and 
Washington Heights believe the burden should be shared between the 




Theme 3: Messages, Messengers, and Health Communication Platforms 
Message 
 Communities emphasize the need for one consistent message to be broadcast 
through a variety of media sources.  Confusion on the topic of pandemic 
influenza exists because of conflicting messages in the media.   
 Public health messaging needs to reach more people.  In Wakefield and 
Chinatown, it was suggested that health officials go out into the communities and 
speak with people one-on-one.  The residents of Bedford-Stuyvesant thought a 
major corporate sponsor such as McDonalds could help broadcast health 
“God says ‘take care of yourself that I will take care of you.’  The city is God… I take 
care of myself and the city takes care of the people.”  
– Male, Washington Heights 
 
“If you first prepare, then it will be easier for the government to help you out.”  
– Male, Chinatown 
 
“I think that the government should give out some supplies themselves – bring every 
household 12 gallons of water and a crate of food or something, and tell them that’s for 
when things get bad.”  
– Male, Wakefield 
“Religious belief is part of a foundation of who they are…so to try 
and eliminate that is a no-no. People are gonna go to church to 
pray, to feel secure, to reach out for hope.” 
   -Male, Washington Heights 
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messages to increase the size of the viewing audience and frequency of 
message.  Astoria suggested broadcasting to already captive audiences at the 
movie theater. The Maimonides Jewish group suggested buying ad space in the 
local papers or creating a telephone hotline. 




 Preferred message timing differs by community.  While Astoria, for example, 
prefers a Just-In-Time type message, Bedford-Stuyvesant and Wakefield feel 




Messenger and Communication Platforms 
 Doctors and other medical professionals are widely regarded as trusted and 
preferred sources of information, whether they are private practitioners, celebrity 




 Religious leaders are another esteemed resource, and can be utilized at a local 
level to promote message dissemination. 
 Schools are a reliable and trusted source of information.  All communities agreed 
that sending home flyers with the children is a surefire way to reach the parents.  
 Some communities put a high level of trust in the mayor and other government 
officials, while others are much more skeptical.   
 
“I believe God, and then next, my doctor.” 
– Female, Jackson Heights 
To Scare or Not to Scare? 
 
“I think what they should do is don’t sugar coat.  They need to scare people.  You know, 
show them the real deal.  This is what a person really looks like when they have the flu.  
This is the suffering.” 
        – Female, Wakefield 
 
“They’re not gonna listen to if you cover your nose, then you won’t catch stuff like that.  
But if you say, this is exactly like if you catch HIV positive, they’re gonna look at that like 
okay, I need to do this now…”  
–Female, Bedford-Stuyvesant 
 
“One problem with scaring them into it is mass hysteria…I think you scare them too 
much you run the risk of starting riots.”  
– Male, Wakefield 
 
“I think when we look at on the larger scale, we say, oh, it’s all over the country, no 
big deal.  But when you bring it home, I guarantee you folks are gonna stand up 
and take attention…because now it is at your doorstep.”  
– Male, Bedford-Stuyvesant 





A total of 69 follow-up interviews were completed out of the 96 respondents, for a follow-
up rate of about 72%.  No participants refused participation – those that were lost to 
follow-up were either unable to be reached or had since left the country.  Follow-up 
interviews lasted an average of about 15 minutes, and participants were compensated 
with a $50 Visa Gift Card which was delivered by mail.  
 
Data collected in the follow-up interviews was analyzed by cases and controls, and by 
neighborhood.  Analysis was limited to the six neighborhoods included in the NCDP 
study, as follow-up data from the Maimonides sister study is currently unavailable.  Due 
to the extremely small sample size of the Jackson Heights follow-up group, this 
neighborhood has been excluded from the interpretation of the results.   
 
Cases vs. Controls 
Appendix Table A4 shows the follow-up data comparing cases and controls.  Due to 
small sample sizes across all groups, few differences between cases and controls were 
found to be statistically significant, but the distributions give insight regarding the four 
topics of interest: Evaluation of Presentation, Evaluation of Brochure, Personal 
Preparedness, and Personal Reactions.   
 
Evaluation of Presentation and Brochure 
Overall, when asked what points they remembered from the presentation, cases and 
controls were able to recall much of the same information (Table 4).  In both groups, 
personal protective measures were most commonly cited as important points 
remembered from the presentation.  The most common guideline respondents were able 
to recall was regarding personal preparedness measures, specifically washing hands, 
covering your cough, and staying away from sick people.  Although topic recall between 
cases and controls were similar, cases were more likely than controls to remember 
details about the differences between pandemic and seasonal flu, personal protective 
measures, and what the city will do in the event of a pandemic.  Both groups found the 








“The mayor of New York City controls everything.  He’s the top dog… you can 
get a group of people, and say, “Hey, look, this is what the mayor says we 
gotta do… People will follow you because it’s coming from the top, and you 
were telling them this all the time.”  
– Male, Bedford-Stuyvesant 
 
“I think as a rule, when they say any news like this, concerning some part of 
political science, people panic a lot.  You don’t always get the whole truth.” 
– Female, Astoria 
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Table 4: Message Recall in Cases vs. Controls 
 Cases (n=44) Controls (n=25) 
Key Points Recalled from Presentation (%) 
Personal protective measures 86 76 
Diff between seasonal and pan flu 11 0 
Sources of further info 7 0 
 
The brochures were similarly regarded by cases and controls.  A total of 68% of 
respondents read or re-read the brochure, and 67% gave the brochure to someone else 
to read.  Use of informational sources found in the brochure varied, and cases were 
slightly more likely than controls to use the suggested sources.  Of all recommended 
sources of information, 3-1-1 was most commonly used, with 26% of all follow-up 
respondents using it in the last 30 days.  Lifenet/Ayudese and www.pandemicflu.gov 
were scarcely used by either cases or controls, and a large proportion (62%) of people 
did not access any of the suggested sources of information. 
 
Personal Preparedness 
As seen in Appendix Table A4, almost everyone who attended the OEM presentation 
talked to others about the flu after the presentation, most people within their own 
household or community.  A significant proportion of respondents (41%) spoke with 11 
or more other people.  Among both cases and controls, home preparedness before and 
after the presentation differed significantly, reflecting the efficacy of the presentation.  
When asked at follow-up if they felt prepared before the presentation, 63% said yes
5
; 
when asked at follow-up if they felt prepared after the presentation, 93% said yes.  The 
increase in feeling of personal preparedness is additionally apparent in the proportion of 
people who say they can now go 1 week or longer without going to the grocery store 
(70%), have washed hands more frequently (93%), cover cough with a tissue or sleeve 
(86%), and feel more confident in their ability to respond should the flu come back 
stronger in the fall (94%).   
 
Personal preparedness strategies with the lowest rates of compliance include stocking 
over-the-counter medications (52%), stocking prescription medication (35%), stopping 
sharing food and drinks (54%), and staying home if sick (61%).   
 
Personal Reactions 
Overall, general reactions to the presentation and brochure did not significantly differ 
between cases and controls.  The proportion of cases whose perception of swine flu was 
changed by the presentation was slightly higher than that of the controls (77% vs. 68%), 
while more controls than cases thought about what might happen in a severe pandemic 
(88% vs. 71%).  Concern about the swine flu before and after the presentation, however, 
did significantly differ between cases and controls.  Cases saw a 34% increase in the 
proportion of people who were concerned about the swine flu whereas there was an 8% 
decrease in the proportion of controls who were concerned over the same time period.  
Confidence in the government’s ability to respond in a pandemic also significantly 
differed, with more controls than cases claiming to be confident (92% vs. 71%).  
                                                 
5
 Notice this proportion is twice that of the baseline questionnaire, indicating respondents self-
proclaimed level of preparedness differed when asked before and after the presentation. 
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Neighborhood Differences 
Follow-up data by neighborhood is presented in Appendix Table A5.   
 
Evaluation of Presentation and Brochure 
Retention of information from the presentation did not differ greatly by neighborhood.  In 
all neighborhoods, personal protective measures were the most frequently recalled 
points.  In general, respondents from Bedford-Stuyvesant, Wakefield, and Astoria were 
able to recall a broader spectrum of topics than were the other neighborhoods.   All 
neighborhoods agreed that the presentation length was appropriate, although 15% of 
respondents in Chinatown thought it too short and 18% of respondents in Astoria 
thought it too long.  Interest in adaptation of the current presentation into a more 
community-specific presentation was expressed in all communities, with the highest 
levels of interest in Astoria, Wakefield, and Bedford-Stuyvesant (73%, 42%, and 36% 
respectively).  
 
Opinions regarding the brochure were slightly more diverse among groups. Despite the 
fact that 87% of all respondents valued the brochure as an effective way to reach 
community members, respondents from Astoria fell far below this average with just 64% 
agreeing to this statement. Members of this community were additionally more selective 
about where they thought brochures should be made available, with receiving it in the 
mail, at the workplace, or in public entertainment venues at the bottom of their list.  Other 
suggested venues included out on the streets, on public transportation, and at social 
service organizations, at malls, retirement homes, libraries, and doctors’ offices. While 
most neighborhoods found the brochure to be visually appealing (73%), just one-fourth 
of the Wakefield respondents felt similarly – this group was also the least likely to have 
read or shared the brochure (50%), and far less likely than other groups to have used 
any of the recommended sources of information (25%). While 3-1-1 was the most 
commonly used of the recommended sources (26%), its use was disproportionately 
distributed among communities with respondents from Bedford-Stuyvesant and Astoria 
much more likely to have accessed it in the last month than people from any other area 
(73% and 55%).  
 
Personal Preparedness 
Actions regarding personal preparedness also differed by community.  In every 
neighborhood, the majority of people spoke to others about the flu while in the home 
setting (65%).  Residents of Washington Heights, Astoria, and Bed-Stuy were more 
likely than residents of the other neighborhoods to speak to others in their community 
(outside the home) about the topic (82%, 73%, and 55%).  Respondents of Bed-Stuy 
and Washington Heights were additionally more likely than others to have spoken about 
the flu with people at a community or religious organization (64% and 36%).  
 
Levels of home preparedness differed significantly from before the presentation to after 
in all communities.  That is, the number of people who claimed to be prepared in the 
home before the presentation (63%) was statistically much lower than the number that 
claimed to exhibit home preparedness following the presentation (93%). Preparation 
strategies followed were very similar across communities.  However, respondents from 
Astoria were much less likely to have stocked food (46%) and over-the-counter 
medication (9%) or to have identified friends and family to rely on in an emergency 
(55%) than other neighborhoods.  Along with Chinatown (55%), Astoria was also less 
likely than other areas to have stocked enough food to last one week or more (46%).   
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Neighborhoods also differed significantly on actions taken to prevent contracting the flu.  
Bed-Stuy was least likely to follow the recommendations of avoiding contact with sick 
people (37%) and ceasing to share food and drinks (27%).  Of the neighborhoods, only 
Chinatown and Jackson Heights had a high proportion of people that stopped sharing 
food and drinks (85% and 75%, respectively).  Of all neighborhoods, residents of Astoria 
were more likely to stay home if sick (73%), but less likely to have cleaned commonly 
used surfaces than in other neighborhoods (55%). 
 
Personal Reactions 
Neighborhood differences in personal reactions to the intervention were minimal. Of all 
neighborhood groups, Chinatown had the lowest proportion of people state that the 
presentation changed the way they thought about swine flu (50%).  It was additionally 
the only group in which level of concern about the swine flu went down after attending 
the intervention.  Bedford-Stuyvesant (64%) and Astoria (46%) were much more 
skeptical of government preparedness of a pandemic. Astoria was also less likely than 
the others to have thought about what might happen in a severe pandemic (55%).  
 
Baseline to Follow-Up Comparison  
Due to the largely qualitative nature of the study design, baseline to follow-up 
comparison is limited.  Figure 5 shows cumulative percentages of respondents’ attitudes 
regarding preparedness, stockpiling food, and trust in government.  Overall levels of 
preparedness improved significantly from baseline to follow-up.  Whereas just 30% of 
people at baseline claimed to be prepared for a major disaster, the proportion of 
prepared respondents rose to 93% of those interviewed at follow-up.  The proportion of 
people who report having stockpiled food is consistent with this apparent increase in 
preparedness, with a two-fold increase from baseline to follow-up in the number of 
people that can last longer than one week on the food supply currently in their household 
(36% vs. 70%).  Trust in government also increased following the presentation, with 64% 
of respondents at baseline feeling confident that the government is adequately prepared 
to respond in a flu pandemic, as compared to 78% of respondents at follow-up. 
 
 
Table 5: Baseline to Follow-Up Comparison of Preparation Measures 
 Baseline (n=174) Follow-up (n=69) 
Preparedness for Major Disaster (%)   
Not prepared 70 7 
Prepared 30 93 
Household Food Stockpile (%)   
1-4 days 27 16 
5-7 days 26 13 
8+ days 36 70 
Trust in Government (%)   
Not confident 36 22 
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Findings from the Maimonides Companion Study  
by Hillary Cohen, MD MPH 
  
t is often assumed that communities will look to local community leaders for 
information and support during times of uncertainty and crisis. These community 
leaders or “experts” may provide valuable information for community specific 
emergency preparedness. The validity of this information, however, will depend on 
concordant views regarding risk, community preparedness and response, trusted 
messengers, and communication between the communities and their leaders.  
 
In this study we interviewed groups of community “experts” from the Pakistani 
community and Orthodox Jewish community in the catchment area of Boro Park, 
Brooklyn. Participants included prominent religious leaders, local businessmen, health 
care providers, and members of community based organizations. Similar to the focus 
group participants, the community “experts” were given a short presentation regarding 
pandemic flu and then participated in a group discussion.   
 
The Orthodox Jewish community experts unanimously believed the community would 
come together and support each other during a pandemic flu crisis. They felt that even 
without government assistance, existing religious and community based organizations 
would meet the needs of the community. These beliefs were partially based on prior 
instances when the Orthodox Jewish community came together to collectively improve 
health behaviors. For examples, the community initiated a program against drunk driving 
and underage drinking during the Purim holiday. The experts collectively invoked the 
Jewish edict valuing the sanctity of life, and felt that this edict would be a prominent force 
driving protective health behaviors among members of their community in the event of a 
flu pandemic. Using religious leaders to disseminate information was considered of 
paramount importance.  
 
It was notable that the Jewish community member focus groups held completely 
concordant views with their community leaders. The views were comparable in terms of 
risk perception, community preparedness and response, trusted messengers, and 
communication. The suggestions given by the community focus groups invoked 
comparable suggestions for message dissemination and cited the same examples when 
the community came together to encourage healthy behaviors. These findings suggest 
that in the Boro Park Orthodox Jewish community, using community leaders or “experts” 
would be valuable adjunct to inform health messaging strategies and may be able to 
serve as a proxy for their community.    
 
In the Pakistani community we found a greater divergence of opinions between the 
Pakistani community leaders or “experts” and the Pakistani community focus groups.  
The Pakistani community leaders collectively agreed that the communities had very little 
trust in government.  They conveyed that there was a great deal of skepticism regarding 
the motives of any government programs, including public health programs.  This 
skepticism was related back to concerns of the Pakistani community in Brooklyn being 
targeted by the US government after 9/11. The expert consensus opinion was that the 
only way to effectively convey risk to the Pakistani community was to use the religious 
structures in place. Targeting health messaging strategies using the mosque and trusted 
religious leaders would be effective. In contrast, the Pakistani community focus group 
participants repeatedly mentioned the importance of using trusted Pakistani doctors to 
I 
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communicate risk and information surrounding pandemic flu.  While it was felt that the 
Mosques should be included in health messaging strategies, they were mentioned as a 
secondary mode of information transmission. Other secondary mode of information 
transmission mentioned included community based organizations, news programs, the 







Additionally, there was a more positive view of the government from the Pakistani 
community members compared to the community experts. The community members 
were generally trusting of the US government. Although, it was mentioned that some  
undocumented immigrants fear deportation if they seek health care, they generally felt 
that the US government would have favorable intentions surrounding programming for 
pandemic flu and the care that they would receive would be vastly improved over the 
health care available in Pakistan.   
 
In general there were similar views between Pakistani community members and the 
community experts surrounding community preparedness and risk perception.  These 
findings suggest that there is a greater divergence of opinion between the Pakistani 
community members and their community “experts.” In the Pakistani community 
surrounding Boro Park, community experts may not reliably serve as proxies for the 
beliefs of the general community. Strategies to inform health messaging should include 
both members of the general community and community experts.  .   
 
Limitations to these findings include that the number of community experts selected 
were few and there may be other members of the community who more accurately 
reflect the general community opinions. The presence of local religious leaders in the 
community expert panel may have biased the discussion towards the importance of the 
mosque in health messaging.   
“Pakistanis go to a lot of doctor’s offices and listen to a lot of doctors. So I think 
if doctors tell them that you should stay home. If doctors promote it then they 
will listen.” 
– Focus Group Participant 
“Those who are illegal, those who do not have papers, when they fall sick, they 
are treated the moment they go to the hospital, everything is done” 
 
– Focus Group Participant 
 
“[In Pakistan] if no one has come along with me the doctor will not touch me, till 
people with money were to reach, even if I were to die.  Here [US], if I do not 
have proper papers or if they are not able to contact my heir, they would not 
allow me to die…If I have to die I will die, but they would not let lack of 
treatment be the cause.”   
 
– Focus Group Participant 
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Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
imilar to the findings from the 2007 NCDP report, the communities studied varied 
widely in their attitudes, perceptions, and anticipated behaviors.  Because these 
are not representatively drawn samples, though, a reader must be careful in 
generalizing from the findings to all residents of a given community, and even more so to 
generalizations about similar or larger communities across the city.  Nonetheless, these 
findings do suggest something about the ways that different communities depend 
upon and trust in government and community-based institutions, and the roles 
that each might play in communicating critical emergency messages.   One way 
that we have considered how the communities differ is based on their perceived 
relationship to government and community.  Table 6 below represents a matrix 
comparing a community’s apparent relationship to local government (generically referred 
to as “state” in the table) and its dependence upon community networks and institutions 
in a health emergency.  This has been inferred from the focus group data collected in 
this and the earlier study, and would require further validation by representative 
sampling in order to corroborate these assumptions.  Mainly we have drawn this based 
on how focus group participants referred to city government and officials (and what they 
expect of them), and how often and in what context they refer to local community 
networks and institutions as instrumental agencies in a health emergency.  We have 
considered the relationships of communities to the city along four dimensions – trusting, 
skeptical (which allows for some trust in a city’s capacity and interest in serving their 
needs but is skeptical of its willingness to do so), wary/mistrustful (suggesting that the 
city has less interest or willingness than those who are merely skeptical), and 
independent (in which a community considers itself in “arms-length” transactions with 
city governance, as if the ethnic community has an extant governance which can 
negotiate its relationships with the city governance structure).  Using these categories, 
we have characterized the Brooklyn Pakistani, Jackson Heights, and Chinatown 
communities as “trusting,” the Astoria community as “skeptical,” the Washington Heights, 
Bedford Stuyvesant, and Wakefield communities as “wary,” and the Brooklyn Orthodox 
Jewish community as “independent.” 
 
Table 6: Community Relationship to Government 
  Dependence on Community 

















  Pakistani 
  Jackson Heights 
  Chinatown 
















The other dimension we coded was the community’s apparent dependence on local 
networks and institutions, and we considered a range of “high dependence” or “low 
S 
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dependence.”  Interestingly, most of those communities with the lowest apparent 
community dependence – the Brooklyn Pakistani, Jackson Heights, and Chinatown 
communities – appeared to the most trusting of the city.  Astoria was also characterized 
as having a low community dependence, but was considered “skeptical” of city 
governance.  Those with the highest community dependence were either mistrustful or 
regarded themselves as independent.  These included the Washington Heights, Bedford 
Stuyvesant, Wakefield, and Brooklyn Orthodox Jewish communities.  This type of 
formative analysis – which would need to be validated with larger statistically 
representative samples – suggests that communication strategies to those in the “Low 
dependence” / “Trusting” categories could be most effectively conveyed directly from the 
city to the population.  In those communities that are less trusting but who have greater 
dependence on community institutions, the city might benefit from significant 
collaborative efforts to communicate through mediating community institutions. 
 
Following the three major themes that emerged from the focus groups – the saliency of 
the risk, community attachment and perception, and communication issues and venues 
– we have arranged a series of recommendations, listed in Table 7.  These represent 
strategies the city should consider to make their health communication and outreach 
even more effective.  Within the domain of the saliency of the threat, the communities 
were quite responsive to the dramatic consequences of the 1918 flu and also to the 
similarities to other “known” communicable diseases, such as HIV/AIDS, SARS or avian 
flu, which are threatening because there is no or limited immunity to the viral agents, no 
vaccine, and no cure.  The city might consider highlighting all of these issues so as to 
raise the public’s perception of risk.  In order to combat public uncertainty about the 
saliency of the threat and the value of recommended actions – both of which could 
minimize people’s perceived risk – it is also worth developing easily accessible answers 
to the most frequently asked questions.  Table 7 below lists those issues which arose 
most frequently in the community sessions, and which had not been answered by the 
brochure or presentation alone. 
 
Table 7: Recommendations for Effective Health Communication and Outreach 
Recommendations     
Risk/Threat  Highlight saliency and urgency of risk by making consequences 
of 1918 more pronounced in the presentation 
 Place flu in the context of communicable diseases such as 
HIV/AIDS, SARS, avian flu: no immunity, vaccine or cure 
 Prepare answers to Frequently Asked Questions 
Community 
 Develop community partners with whom to present Ready New 
York material 
  o CERTs and Community Boards 
  o Religious leaders and institutions 
 Consider development of alternative sites of care and information 




 Consider “hard-sell” campaigns similar to NYS smoking cessation 
campaign 
 Terms “isolation” and “quarantine” connoted sense of martial law 
among several communities 
 Subway a concern to many – consider ad campaign on mass 
transit focused on social distancing and personal protective 
measures 
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   Add private doctors as dissemination site and as key resource 
   Mailing brochure an effective mechanism 
   Encourage the utilization of telephone and internet resources 
among non-English speaking communities 
    o 311 as primary information source 
 
 
In considering how the city could engage communities more directly, navigate 
community institutions and partners, and be responsive to community-specific issues 
and needs, several broad recommendations are offered. The first is to continue to 
expand existing partnerships through the Ready New York infrastructure through CERTs 
and community boards (with particular attention to block presidents, in those 
communities with such an infrastructure), and also through religious leaders and 
institutions.  The faith-based community can be extremely helpful in disseminating 
messages, crafting messages around shared responsibility using religious ethics, 
adopting strategies that take into account the need to modify religious practices and 
rituals, and generally conveying key messages about social distancing.  A common 
denominator among all these community partnering strategies is to consider ways of 
having community leaders and institutions sponsor community forums, have an active 
role in community presentations (so it represents more bilateral communication than 
merely a “top-down” message from the city to a particular community), and be involved 
in “train-the-trainer” efforts as well.  Furthermore, several focus groups mentioned 
expanding community-based sites where they could access information and medical 
care, in the event of a pandemic, so they wouldn’t regard hospital emergency 
departments as their only potential service and information site. 
 
Under the rubric of communication, which includes messengers, messages, media, and 
timing, several recommendations are offered: (1) to consider developing a “hard-sell” 
campaign similar to the state’s smoking cessation campaign ; (2) to avoid the terms 
“isolation” and “quarantine,” which have negative connotations to many people, and are 
generally misunderstood anyway; (3) to address the subway as both a potential infection 
site and as a critical messaging platform, since it was of great concern to many of the 
community respondents; (4) to consider private medical doctors as a key information 
dissemination source and service site; (5) to consider mailing brochures; and (6) to 
encourage the utilization of telephone and Internet resources, particularly among limited-
English proficiency populations.  As with the earlier 2007 study, the city’s 311 system 
was highly regarded as an effective means of providing access to critical citywide 
information. 
 
Lastly, the research team considered the best match of risk communication timing and 
objectives.  In terms of timing, we have characterized three distinct phases – a 
“preparedness phase” far in advance of an event, a just-in-time “near phase” in which 
the event is imminent, and a just-in-time “here phase” in which the event is present.  As 
illustrated in table 8, we have further considered five types of messages and the most 
appropriate phases in which to disseminate the message in order to be most widely 
heard and attended to.  The first message is that of encouraging household stockpiling 
and general preparedness, which makes sense during the advance stage and the “near 
phase.”  Raising situation awareness similarly makes sense in these two stages, since 
once an event in “here” the public is actively seeking information and there is little need 
to raise further situational awareness.  Those strategic recommendations that target 
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specific behaviors, such as promoting personal protective measures, non-
pharmaceutical interventions, and decision-making regarding treatment and vaccines, 
are obviously of greatest value in the “near” and “here” phases, when populations are 
most sensitized and attendant to such messages. 
 









Encourage household stockpiling √ √  
Raise situational awareness √ √  
Promote personal protective measures  √ √ 
Explain non-pharmaceutical interventions  √ √ 
Assist decision-making regarding vaccine / 
treatment 
 √ √ 
 
Appendix 1: Data Tables 
 
















                   
Total (n) 13 15 31 6 50 28 16 15 174 
Borough Queens Brooklyn Manhattan Queens Brooklyn Brooklyn Bronx Manhattan   

















































Male (%) 38.5 53.3 51.6 66.7 70.0 39.3 37.5 40.0 52.3 
Foreign born (%) 53.9 46.7 96.8 83.3 28.0 25.0 62.5 100.0 64.9 
Any children (%) 23.1 40.0 19.4 16.7 42.0 57.1 18.8 20.0 33.9 
Employed (%) 46.2 46.7 29.0 66.7 52.0 35.7 37.5 13.3 40.2 
Living below 
poverty line (%) 
23.3 39.1 36.5 14.4 30.4 30.4 25.1 45.6 21.0 
Language of 
Presentation 
English English Cantonese English English Urdu English Spanish 
  
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 significant difference across all groups.  
 
  

















          
Total (n) 13 15 31 6 50 28 16 15 174 
Preparedness for a major disaster (%)           
Not prepared 38.5 53.3 25.8 33.3 30.0 32.1 68.8 46.7 37.4 
Prepared or preparing 23.1 33.3 58.1 0.0 22.0 39.3 6.3 20.0 29.9 
No intent to prepare 38.5 6.7 12.9 50.0 48.0 28.6 25.0 33.3 31.0 
Experienced a major disaster (%) 30.8 40.0 64.5 16.7 24.0 17.9 31.3 33.3 33.3 
Leadership in a disaster situation (%)           
Others will look to respondent for leadership 23.1 60.0 6.5 16.7 12.0 3.6 12.5 46.7 17.8 
Respondent will work alone to protect self and family 69.2 33.3 38.7 66.7 60.0 85.7 62.5 13.3 55.2 
Respondent will turn to someone else for leadership 0.0 0.0 38.7 0.0 18.0 10.7 18.8 13.3 16.7 
Respondent will wait for help to arrive 7.7 6.7 12.9 0.0 8.0 0.0 6.3 20.0 8.1 
Confident in government during an epidemic (%) 38.5 40.0 80.7 83.3 54.0 89.3 50.0 73.3 64.4 
Received flu shot during previous year (%) 7.7 46.7 51.6 66.7 24.0 39.3 56.3 33.3 37.4 
Time household can live on food supplies (%)           
1 day 0.0 0.0 6.5 0.0 4.0 0.0 18.8 40.0 7.5 
2-4 days 38.5 20.0 45.2 16.7 32.0 28.6 6.3 20.0 29.3 
5-7 days 30.8 20.0 12.9 33.3 36.0 17.9 37.5 26.7 26.4 
1 week or longer 30.8 60.0 32.3 33.3 28.0 53.6 37.5 13.3 35.6 
Source of daily news (%)           
Television 30.8 60.0 45.2 50.0 16.0 60.7 62.5 73.3 43.7 
Newspaper/magazine 7.7 26.7 32.3 16.7 26.0 0.0 12.5 0.0 17.8 
Internet 30.8 0.0 6.5 16.7 34.0 28.6 6.3 13.3 20.1 





Table A3: General Findings Matrix 
















See a difference 
in risk between 
high and low 
SES.  Feel more 





Also concern that 
uneducated/ 
ignorant will act 
as vectors. 
















Feel at risk if 
environment is 
dirty. Elderly 








rant will act as 
vectors.  Those 
who use mass 
transit are more 
at risk, all else 
equal. Some 
reliance on 
native remedies.  
Worry has 
faded. Feel at 
more at risk for 
contracting due 
to daily religious 
gatherings. Also 
feel they have 
greater capacity 
to cope than 
others. Believe 
after 9/11 are 





illness.  Will 








kids as viral 
portals. Feel 
more at risk 
due to lower 






Everyone is at 
risk, but they may 
be higher due to 
the many social 
classes in the 
area. Also 
concerned 
because they are 
an affectionate 
culture and germs 







stockpile due to 
reliance on fresh 
produce. Concern 
for elders and 
children. Organize 
around church 
and Greek orgs.  
Ultimately the city 
has the money 





pandemic flu.  




on others in 
community.  
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should do what 









it is easier for 
the gov’t to 




is linguistically at 
disadvantage. 
High level of 
trust in religious 
organizations. 
Food stockpiles 
tend to be large, 
with families 
able to go 2-3 
weeks on dry 
goods and rice.  








supply a 30-day 
survival 
package. Focus 
is on religious 






Kinship is more 
important than 
other social or 
communal 
networks. 
Homes will be 
able to stock for 
maximum one 
week.  Believe it 
is the city’s 
responsibility to 




















prevention is key. 
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doctors and 
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Many opposed to 
mayor and other 
politicians. More 
interested in JIT 
message, but 
must hear it at 
least 7 times. Run 
the presentation 
in Greek.  Use 
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Many with low 
reading ability. 
Restaurants 





Trust higher in 
gov’t than in 
media. Will trust 
primary doctors, 
but may not be 
able to reach 















city and local 
gov’t for advice, 










about the topic.  
Should use 









and the media. 
Should 









may be offensive. 
Small group 
presentations 
empower.  Be 
sure to include 
rationale behind 
recommendations 
for people to trust.  
Use sports figure 
to promote. 
Table A4.  Follow-up by Case/Control     
  Case  Control Total 
        
  Total (n) 44 25 69 
 PRESENTATION (%)    
 Important points remembered    
 Differences between pandemic and seasonal flu 11.4 0.0 7.3 
 Personal protective measures 86.4 76.0 82.6 
 Past pandemics 6.8 12.0 8.7 
 What the city will do  6.8 4.0 5.8 
 Sources of further information 6.8 0.0 4.4 
 What the city will be like 6.8 8.0 7.3 
 Other 15.9 28.0 20.3 
 Usefulness    
 Very useful 77.3 72.0 75.4 
 Somewhat useful 22.7 28.0 24.6 
  Not at all useful 0.0 0.0 0.0 
     
        
 Total (n) 44 25 69 
  BROCHURE (%)       
 Read or re-read brochure since it was given  70.5 64.0 68.1 
 Given brochure to anyone else 72.7 56.0 66.7 
 Used the following sources in the past month    
 Lifenet/Ayudese 4.6 0.0 2.9 
 311 27.3 24.0 26.1 
 www.pandemicflu.gov 9.1 4.0 7.3 
 nyc.gov 22.7 8.0 17.4 
  none 56.8 72.0 62.3 
     
        
  Total (n) 44 25 69 
 PERSONAL PREPAREDNESS (%)    
 Talked to others about the flu 97.7 92.0 95.7 
      Where? (n) 43 23 66 
 In household 62.8 69.6 65.2 
 In community* 58.1 30.4 48.5 
 At work or school 34.9 43.5 37.9 
 Community organization 18.6 26.1 21.2 
 Other 41.9 39.1 40.9 
      How many have you spoken to (n) 43 23 66 
 1-5 20.9 17.4 19.7 
 6-10 32.6 30.4 31.8 
 11+ 46.5 52.2 48.5 
 Home Preparedness**    
 BEFORE the presentation* 59.1 70.8 63.2 
 AFTER the presentation 90.9 95.8 92.7 
 Preparedness strategies followed    
 Stocked food 72.7 76.0 73.9 
 Stocked water 70.5 76.0 72.5 
 Stocked over-the-counter medication 45.5 64.0 52.2 
 Stocked prescription medication 29.6 44.0 34.8 
 Bought extra cleaning and hygiene supplies 77.3 76.0 76.8 
 
Identified friends and family to rely on in 
emergency 70.5 88.0 76.8 
  Other 15.9 8.0 13.0 
     
     
  Total (n) 44 25 69 
 Length household can last without going to grocer    
 1 day 0.0 4.0 1.5 
 2-4 days 13.6 16.0 14.5 
 5-7 days 11.4 16.0 13.0 
 1 week or longer 75.0 60.0 69.6 
 Actions taken to protect from the flu    
 Washed hands more frequently 90.9 96.0 92.8 
 Covered cough with your sleeve or a tissue 90.9 76.0 85.5 
 Avoided contact with sick people 61.4 64.0 62.3 
 Stayed at home if sick 61.4 60.0 60.9 
 Stopped sharing food or drinks 50.0 60.0 53.6 
 Cleaned commonly used surfaces 77.3 76.0 76.8 
 Other 18.2 4.0 13.0 
 If the flu came back stronger, now better prepared 90.9 100.0 94.2 
  Paid more attention to news about the flu 81.8 84.0 82.6 
     
        
  Total (n) 44 25 69 
 PERSONAL REACTIONS (%)      
 Presentation changed thinking about the swine flu 77.3 68.0 73.9 
 
Thought about what might happen in a severe 
pandemic 70.5 88.0 76.8 
 Concern about the swine flu    
 PRIOR to the presentation* 50.0 76.0 59.4 
 AFTER the presentation 84.1 68.0 78.3 
  Confidence in government preparedness*  70.5 92.0 78.3 
 
Notes: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 significant difference across all groups.  
            Figures are percents unless otherwise indicated    
Table A5.  Follow up by Community 
  







                
  Total (n) 20 11 11 12 4 11 69 
 PRESENTATION (%)        
 Important points remembered        
 Differences between pandemic and seasonal flu 5.0 18.2 0.0 8.3 25.0 0.0 7.3 
 Personal protective measures 90.0 81.8 81.8 66.7 100.0 81.8 82.6 
 Past pandemics 5.0 18.2 9.1 8.3 0.0 9.1 8.7 
 What the city will do  0.0 18.2 0.0 8.3 0.0 9.1 5.8 
 Sources of further information 0.0 9.1 0.0 8.3 0.0 9.1 4.4 
 What the city will be like 5.0 18.2 9.1 8.3 0.0 0.0 7.3 
 Other 15.0 0.0 45.5 25.0 0.0 27.3 20.3 
 Length        
 Too long 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 18.2 4.4 
 Too short 15.0 9.1 0.0 8.3 25.0 9.1 10.1 
 Appropriate 85.0 90.9 100.0 91.7 50.0 72.7 85.5 
 Type preferred*        
 Specific to community 15.0 36.4 27.3 41.7 50.0 72.7 36.2 
 General 50.0 63.6 72.7 58.3 50.0 18.2 52.2 
 Doesn't matter 30.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.7 
 Don't know 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.1 2.9 
 Usefulness**        
 Very useful 60.0 81.8 100.0 100.0 75.0 45.5 75.4 
 Somewhat useful 40.0 18.2 0.0 0.0 25.0 54.6 24.6 
  Not at all useful 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
         
                
    







 Total (n) 20 11 11 12 4 11 69 
  BROCHURE (%)               
 
Brochure was effective to reach community 
members* 
100.0 81.8 100.0 83.3 75.0 63.6 87.0 
    Brochures should be available at (n) 20 9 11 10 3 7 60 
 Grocery stores** 20.0 88.9 18.2 60.0 66.7 57.1 43.33 
 Hospital clinics* 15.0 77.8 54.6 60.0 66.7 42.9 45.0 
 Sent by mail* 40.0 55.6 63.6 60.0 100.0 0.0 48.3 
 Workplace*** 10.0 66.7 0.0 60.0 33.3 0.0 25.0 
 Public entertainment venues 25.0 55.6 54.6 30.0 33.3 0.0 33.3 
 Schools** 10.0 77.8 36.4 30.0 33.3 57.1 35.0 
 Other 75.0 77.8 81.8 70.0 100.0 100.0 80.0 
 Read or re-read brochure since it was given  75.0 72.7 81.8 50.0 75.0 54.6 68.1 
 Given brochure to anyone else** 60.0 90.9 72.7 25.0 100.0 81.8 66.7 
  Brochure was visually appealing 80.0 72.7 81.8 50.0 75.0 72.7 72.5 
                
  







 Total (n) 20 11 11 12 4 11 69 
 Used the following sources in the past month        
 Lifenet/Ayudese 0.0 9.1 0.0 8.3 0.0 0.0 2.9 
 311*** 10.0 72.7 9.1 8.3 0.0 54.6 26.09 
 www.pandemicflu.gov* 0.0 9.1 0.0 8.3 50.0 9.1 7.25 
 nyc.gov** 5.0 36.4 0.0 8.3 75.0 27.3 17.39 
  none*** 85.0 18.2 90.9 75.0 25.0 36.4 62.32 
         
                
    







  Total (n) 20 11 11 12 4 11 69 
 PERSONAL PREPAREDNESS (%)        
 Talked to others about the flu 95.0 100.0 100.0 91.7 75.0 100.0 95.7 
      Where? (n) 19 11 11 11 3 11 66 
 In household 57.9 72.7 81.8 54.6 33.3 72.7 65.2 
 In community* 21.1 54.6 81.8 36.4 33.3 72.7 48.5 
 At work or school 42.1 54.6 27.3 36.4 33.3 27.3 37.9 
 
Community organization like church or 
synagogue** 
5.3 63.6 36.4 18.2 0.0 0.0 
21.2 
 Other*** 73.7 9.1 9.1 54.6 100.0 18.2 40.9 
      How many have you spoken to* (n) 19 11 11 11 3 11 66 
 1-5 21.1 18.2 0.0 27.3 0.0 36.4 19.7 
 6-10 15.8 18.2 45.5 45.5 0.0 54.6 31.8 
 11+ 63.2 63.6 54.6 27.3 100.0 9.1 48.5 
 Home preparedness**        
 BEFORE the presentation* 85.0 81.8 36.4 63.6 50.0 36.4 63.2 
 AFTER the presentation* 95.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 50.0 81.8 92.7 
 Preparedness strategies followed        
 Stocked food* 70.0 81.8 100.0 83.3 50.0 45.5 73.9 
 Stocked water* 75.0 63.6 100.0 75.0 25.0 63.6 72.5 
 Stocked over-the-counter medication** 70.0 63.6 72.7 33.3 50.0 9.1 52.2 
 Stocked prescription medication 30.0 36.4 45.5 50.0 25.0 18.2 34.8 
 Bought extra cleaning and hygiene supplies* 85.0 72.7 100.0 75.0 25.0 63.6 76.8 
 
Identified friends and family to rely on in 
emergency** 
95.0 81.8 63.6 91.7 25.0 54.6 
76.8 
 Other*** 5.0 18.2 27.3 8.3 25.0 9.1 13.0 
 
Length household can last without going to the 
grocery* 
      
 
 1 day 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 
 2-4 days 35.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 27.3 14.5 
 5-7 days 5.0 27.3 9.1 8.3 0.0 27.3 13.0 
  1 week or longer 55.0 72.7 90.9 83.3 100.0 45.5 69.6 
 Actions taken to protect from the flu        
 Washed hands more frequently* 100.0 81.8 100.0 100.0 75.0 81.8 92.8 
                
    







  Total (n) 20 11 11 12 4 11 69 
 Covered cough with your sleeve or a tissue 85.0 81.8 81.8 100.0 100.0 72.7 85.5 
 Avoided contact with sick people 65.0 36.4 81.8 58.3 75.0 63.6 62.3 
 Stayed at home if sick* 60.0 63.6 63.6 50.0 50.0 72.7 60.9 
 Stopped sharing food or drinks** 85.0 27.3 45.5 33.3 75.0 45.5 53.6 
 Cleaned commonly used surfaces* 85.0 72.7 100.0 66.7 75.0 54.6 76.8 
 Other*** 10.0 18.2 18.2 8.3 0.0 18.2 13.0 
 If the flu came back stronger, now better prepared 100.0 100.0 100.0 91.7 75.0 81.8 94.2 
  Paid more attention to news about the flu 75.0 100.0 100.0 75.0 100.0 63.6 82.6 
         
                
    







  Total (n) 20 11 11 12 4 11 69 
 PERSONAL REACTIONS (%)         
 Presentation changed thinking about the swine flu 50.0 81.8 90.9 83.3 100.0 72.7 73.9 
 
Thought about what might happen in a severe 
pandemic 
80.0 81.8 90.9 83.3 50.0 54.6 76.8 
 Concern about the swine flu        
 PRIOR to the presentation 80.0 54.6 54.6 58.3 25.0 45.5 59.4 
 AFTER the presentation 75.0 90.9 54.6 83.3 100.0 81.8 78.3 
  Confidence in government preparedness*  95.0 63.6 90.9 75.0 100.0 45.5 78.3 
 
Notes: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 significant difference across all groups.      
            Figures are percents unless otherwise indicated        
 
 
